

The BJA Executive Session on

Police Leadership

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The principals are supported in their work by a team that includes project co-directors Darrel W. Stephens and Bill Geller, project strategist Nancy McKeon, and BJA Senior Policy Advisor Steve Edwards.

Five Police Departments Building Trust and Collaboration

Innovations in Policing Clinic
Yale Law School
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina

Short Version of the Case

by
Caroline Van Zile



Short Version of the Case

Trust and Collaboration in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina

Caroline Van Zile, in collaboration with members of Yale Law School's Innovations in Policing Clinic

Introduction

Like most cities in the 1990s, Charlotte had a crime problem.¹ This problem had grown in the 1970s and 1980s and had concentrated in low-income, minority neighborhoods.²

In response, for more than two decades, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) has worked to build trust and engage in collaboration with all of its residents, including residents of disadvantaged communities.

The story of the CMPD is not the story of a single successful or innovative program that turned the department around. Rather, it is the story of a series of police chiefs who altered the design and structure of their department to increase community trust and reduce crime. For Charlotte, consistency has been the key to reform.

Origin of the CMPD

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department was created as a new department in 1993 through the merger of the Charlotte and Mecklenburg Police Departments. Planned for several years, the merger allowed Chief Dennis Nowicki to engrain a community-centered, collaborative ethic from the start. Both the Charlotte and the Mecklenburg Departments suffered from a history of segregation and oppression, so beginning with a thoughtful approach to disadvantaged communities was key. To learn more, see RYAN L. SUMNER, *IMAGES OF AMERICA: CHARLOTTE AND MECKLENBURG COUNTY POLICE* (2010).

Any department could adopt several of these principles or techniques and improve its relationship with disadvantaged communities, but Charlotte has pursued each of these principles for a sustained period of time. By adopting specific, routine practices like community newsletters, satisfaction surveys, and officer evaluations based on collaboration and trust building, Charlotte has improved the culture of its Department and its relationship with citizens.

These structural changes in Charlotte have led to enduring change. Moreover, they can be replicated elsewhere. Examining the department's initiatives over the last two decades,

¹ ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & STEVEN RAPHAEL, BROOKINGS INST., CITY AND SUBURBAN CRIME TRENDS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 15 (2011); Op Ed., *Applaud CMPD Role in Crime Rate Decline*, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 24, 2011, <http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2011/10/24/2717823/applaud-cmpd-role-in-crime-rate.html>.

² *See id.*

three principles provide a roadmap for any leader looking to replicate the CMPD's efforts: (1) measure what matters; (2) sweat the small stuff; and (3) strengthen transparency and communication.

The CMPD has pursued these three initiatives consistently during the tenure of the three separate chiefs of police. The department's success also owes to continued willingness to experiment with new policing strategies: Community Policing in the 1980s, Problem Oriented Policing in the 1990s, and statistics-driven tactics today.

Citizens and community leaders report marked improvements in their interactions with the department over the last 10 to 20 years. However, since the CMPD's approach to collaboration is not a packaged program, it may be harder to replicate than other innovations.

Further, the CMPD still faces a number of obstacles. Change in Charlotte has been very police-driven, and collaboration with the community is usually police-led. In addition, the department focuses much of its measurement on Part I crime while Part II crimes or other illegal activity—like drug markets—may also be disruptive to citizens of disadvantaged communities.

Background on Charlotte

Charlotte is a large and diverse city that benefitted substantially from the economic growth of the 1990s. Charlotte is America's fifth-largest urban region and the second-largest banking center.³ Yet the city remains deeply segregated. Although Charlotte is still experiencing something of an economic boom, the profits have been distributed unevenly throughout the city.

A recent study by the University of North Carolina (UNC) Charlotte Urban Institute showed lingering educational and socio-economic disparities between whites and African-Americans in particular.⁴ In 2002, the rate of poverty for African-Americans was 25 percent, twice that of whites.⁵ Black residents were also more likely to live in areas with low property values or in substandard housing.⁶ The recent recession has hit Charlotte's poorest neighborhoods hard.⁷

While Charlotte has been attempting to alleviate racial tensions between whites and blacks for some time, the city has recently experienced an unexpected increase in its La-

³ ANDREA SCHNEIDER, OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY POLICING IN ACTION: A PRACTITIONER'S EYE VIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 24 (2003).

⁴ UNC CHARLOTTE URBAN INST., THE STATE OF AFRICAN AMERICANS & HISPANICS/LATINOS IN THE CHARLOTTE REGION 8 (Cheryl Ramsaur Roberts ed., 2003).

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ *Cf.* Bruce Katz & Robert Lang, 3 Redefining Urban and Suburban America: Evidence from Census 2000, at 152 n.29 (2006) (noting that, while Charlotte experienced an economic boom in the 1990s, this boom may have left poorer parts of the region behind).

tino population, which added a further layer of complexity to the city's race relations. Between 1990 and 2000, Charlotte experienced a 614 percent increase in its Latino population.⁸ Latinos are on average less wealthy and less educated than whites.⁹

In the last few years, the population has expanded rapidly, surging by 35 percent between 2000 and 2010.¹⁰ As of the 2010 census, Charlotte's population was nearing 750,000.¹¹ Around 45 percent of the population is white, 35 percent is black, and 13 percent is Hispanic, with the remainder identifying as Asian or multiracial.¹² Nearly 14 percent of the population is foreign-born, and 17 percent of households speak a language other than English.¹³

In addition to policing Charlotte itself, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) is responsible for patrolling parts of Mecklenburg County.¹⁴ Accordingly, the CMPD's jurisdiction, which encompasses all of Charlotte and a portion of Mecklenburg, includes 778,958 total residents and covers 438 square miles of territory.¹⁵ As of 2010, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department had 1,757 sworn officers and employed 564 civilians.¹⁶

In the CMPD, the majority of officers (87 percent) are male.¹⁷ In terms of ethnic diversity, 77 percent of officers are white; 17 percent are black; 3 percent are Hispanic; and 2 percent are Asian.¹⁸ Given the city's diversity, these statistics are surprising. The current chief, Rodney D. Monroe, is an African-American male and is Charlotte's first black chief of police.¹⁹

Like most cities in the 1990s, Charlotte had a crime problem.²⁰ This problem had grown in the 1970s and 1980s and had concentrated in low-income, minority neighborhoods.²¹ Although the department claims that Charlotte's focus on trust and collaboration wasn't

⁸ CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG POLICE DEP'T, *HISPANIC ROBBERY INITIATIVE: REDUCING ROBBERY VICTIMIZATION AND INCREASING TRUST OF POLICE AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN A HISPANIC COMMUNITY* 1 (2002).

⁹ UNC CHARLOTTE URBAN INST., *supra* note 4, at 8-9.

¹⁰ Charlotte: Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37/3712000.html> (last visited Nov. 3, 2011).

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² *Id.*

¹³ *Id.*

¹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁷ See E-mail from Paul Paskoff, Unit Leader, Planning and Research Division, to Caroline Van Zile, Student, Yale Law School (Jan. 31, 2012, 11:21 EST) (on file with author).

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ *Chief of Police*, CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT, <http://charmeck.org/city/charlotte/CMPD/organization/PoliceChief/Pages/default.aspx> (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).

²⁰ ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & STEVEN RAPHAEL, BROOKINGS INST., *CITY AND SUBURBAN CRIME TRENDS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA* 15 (2011); Op Ed., *Applaud CMPD Role in Crime Rate Decline*, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 24, 2011, <http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2011/10/24/2717823/applaud-cmpd-role-in-crime-rate.html>.

²¹ *See id.*

prompted by any particular incident,²² the relationship between the majority-white police department and the low-income, minority communities they frequently patrol was strained in the 1990s. A series of police shootings involving white officers and black residents in the mid-1990s nearly brought the city to a boiling point. In this period, collaborative policing began to build momentum.

What Is Community-Problem Oriented Policing?

Charlotte used a very particular, data- and observation-driven model to identify recurring problems and address them by collaborating with the community under Stephen's regime. This method was called "community-problem oriented policing." After identifying the root cause of the crime, officers in each department would brainstorm solutions and identify potential community partners. After the intervention, results would be measured and the process repeated. This method was combined with traditional community policing to produce Charlotte's unique operating method.

Understanding that the city was in trouble—and that the police department in particular was in a bad place—the Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners and the Charlotte City Council launched a Community Building Task Force to collaboratively address issues of racial tension in the city.²³ Dismayed at the destruction that racial misunderstanding seemed to be causing, the community rallied around "Something Has Begun," a landmark civic engagement event organized by the Community Building Task Force. The event drew over 600 residents in December of 1997, as the city came together to rethink race's role in the Charlotte education system, economy, and particularly in the police department.²⁴

Over the last two decades, three CMPD police chiefs have undertaken the task of building bonds with citizens in disadvantaged communities. Under Chief Dennis Nowicki, the Department adopted a community-oriented policing approach in the 1990s, partnering with community organizations and homeowners to reduce disorder in neighborhoods.²⁵ Charlotte's first major community-oriented initiative was pointedly undertaken in a low-income, African-American neighborhood where calls for service were disproportionately high.²⁶

²² See Telephone Interview with Darrel Stephens, former Chief of Police, Charlotte Police Dep't (Nov. 22, 2011) ("The police – Charlotte never had the riots that some other cities did. . . . What you had more was a sense that the department – they were just policing like most police departments police around the country.").

²³ See *History of CBI*, COMMUNITY BUILDING INITIATIVE, <http://www.communitybuildinginitiative.org/default.aspx?cbi=73> (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).

²⁴ *History of CBI*, *supra* note 23.

²⁵ GELLER & BELSKY, *supra* note 26, at 33-35.

²⁶ See BILL GELLER & LISA BELSKY, OFFICE OF COMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE TO BUILDING OUR WAY OUT OF CRIME 33-35 (2009) (detailing Charlotte's efforts in Genesis Park); see also JAMES T. JORDAN & EDWARD F. DAVIS III, CMTY. SAFETY INITIATIVE, CRIME-FIGHTING PARTNERSHIPS: HOW TO LEVERAGE THE CAPACITY OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPERS (2005) (describing Charlotte's early community policing efforts in low-income, minority housing projects).

Under Chief Darrel Stephens, who led the CMPD from 1999 to 2008, the Department adopted a community-problem oriented policing approach, which utilized community resources to address particular “problems” or crime trends.²⁷ The present chief, Rodney Monroe, is using many of the same problem-solving and community-partnership mechanisms adopted by Stephens, but has incorporated more data from the CompStat computerized crime system in each patrol division’s crime analysis and response plans.²⁸

Who Is Rodney Monroe?

Rodney Monroe has been the Chief of Police since 2008 and has brought a statistics-centered methodology to the CMPD. He is Charlotte’s first African-American police chief. According to Charlotte’s website, “With more than thirty years experience in law enforcement, Chief Monroe is a recognized innovator and practitioner of community policing. Since joining the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, he has refocused the Department on crime fighting and crime prevention through a more accountable organizational structure, new and advanced technology and a more engaging strategy of community policing.” Chief Monroe rose through the ranks of the Washington, D.C. Police Department before leading the departments in Macon, Georgia and Richmond, Virginia.

Charlotte’s Three-Part Reform

Using a broad variety of measurement techniques has allowed the department to better communicate with citizens, collaborate with them to address crime trends, and build trust.

The impact on crime in Charlotte over the last two decades has been impressive—although the change, for the most part, took the form of a slowly rising wave. Crime declined 37 percent between 1991 and 2001 during Nowicki’s and Stephen’s early tenure,²⁹ more or less on par with the national average.³⁰ However, as of 2005, Charlotte was still one of America’s ten most dangerous cities to live in.³¹

In the last four years, however, under Monroe, crime has declined even more dramatically. The crime rate dropped almost 28 percent between 2008 and 2010 alone.³² By comparison, nationally the violent crime rate dropped about 10 percent and property crime

²⁷ See generally Darrel W. Stephens, *Community Problem Oriented Policing: The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Experience* (2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing Stephens’s approach).

²⁸ See *Chief of Police*, *supra* note 19.

²⁹ Stephens, *supra* note 11, at 19.

³⁰ Press Release, University of California - Berkeley, *New Research Reveals Historic 1990s US Crime Decline*,

(Feb. 16, 2007) (noting that crime declined around 40 percent over the 1990s), available at http://www.eurekaalert.org/pub_releases/2007-02/uoc--nrr021207.php.

³¹ See also Justice Policy Inst., *New Crime Statistics 2* (2005), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/fbi_crime_report.pdf (showing that over two decades after Charlotte first implemented COP, it was still one of America’s most dangerous cities). Note, however, that the FBI strongly discourages ranking cities, as the Policy Institute does here.

³² CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG POLICE DEP’T at 26-27.

dropped about 7 percent.³³ Charlotte is not only off of the “Top Ten” list of most dangerous cities—it no longer even ranks in the top 100.³⁴ The impact on officers’ relationship with the community is harder to gauge. Data collected by the Urban Institute in 2003 did seem promising. The Institute surveyed predominantly African-American voting districts via phone interview regarding crime and policing. Almost 300 black residents and over 30 Hispanic residents responded.³⁵

Most respondents surveyed—70.8 percent—strongly agreed that the police were doing a good job.³⁶ Whereas 36 percent agreed that they feared for their safety in 1996, by 2003 only 25 percent experienced fear in their neighborhood.³⁷ Forty-one percent of Hispanics, however, reported fearing for their safety—a disproportionate number.³⁸ About 70 percent of all those surveyed commented that police visibility was good in their neighborhood, and 77.8 percent of those who had contact with the police reported that their interactions were generally friendly.³⁹

Other statistics also point to Charlotte’s success in building trust and collaboration and increasing community satisfaction. A rough comparison places CMPD ahead of national approval rates, both for the population at large and minority communities. Nationally, 61 percent of white Americans report having a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the police, only 43 percent of African-Americans report similar levels of trust.⁴⁰ The confidence numbers for the CMPD are about 20 percent higher, and the disparity between whites and minorities is 12 percent rather than 18 percent.

As of last year, approval ratings were still high in minority communities, but they lagged behind the approval levels offered by whites on almost every survey question.⁴¹ While 80 percent of all respondents reported positive feelings about the CMPD, only 68 percent responded positively in the minority community.⁴² Ratings regarding police integrity, while not low, also showed disparities, as did approval of police use of force.⁴³

The CMPD credits its success to setting a strategic mission and goals. Its **first principle** is constantly measuring what matters. A plan is formulated every few years, and the Department comes together periodically to take stock of process and refocus. They assess progress in multiple ways: grilling lieutenants about their community relationships in

³³ See *Crime in the United States*, Federal Bureau of Investigation, <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls> (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).

³⁴ CQPress, *City Crime Rate Rankings: 2010-11*, at 1 (2010), http://os.cqpress.com/citycrime/2010/City_crime_rate_2010-2011_hightolow.pdf (showing that Charlotte is now not even in the top one-hundred most dangerous cities).

³⁵ See UNC CHARLOTTE URBAN INST., *supra* note 4, at 33.

³⁶ *Id.* at 35.

³⁷ *Id.* at 34.

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ *Id.* at 36.

⁴⁰ Bureau of Justice Statistics.

⁴¹ Appendix G, at 15.

⁴² *Id.*

⁴³ *Id.*

CompStat meetings, running a detailed survey every year to measure community satisfaction, and testing neighborhoods to see if they feel comfortable summoning the police.

The key to measurement and data analysis is CompStat, but Charlotte's version is CompStat with a collaborative twist. Every 28 days districts report on their progress; two districts report during each meeting. During these morning meetings, the room is full—not only with the captains and lieutenants offering their district reports, but with detectives assigned to that district, with community coordinators, with partners from the vice squad, with guests from other districts hoping to learn best practices, with parole officers, and with other officers who are simply interested.

The **second principle** driving CMPD's success could be categorized as "sweating the small stuff." Former Chief Stephens cared if citizens were upset about their trash not being picked up or about a dilapidated building next door; he saw such disorder as a potential source of crime.⁴⁴ Stephens would instruct his officers to interface with other city departments and to personally ensure that neighborhood disorder was being addressed.⁴⁵ He also required officers to proactively engage with community members to better determine their needs by attending picnics or meetings at churches, as well as by interfacing with them on day-to-day patrols.⁴⁶

While this strategy is by no means specific to low-income or minority communities, it may have been particularly helpful in those neighborhoods. More affluent communities generally are better able to self-police.⁴⁷ These neighborhoods have the political capital with which to obtain needed city services, and social networks have been built to foster intra-community collaboration without the police.⁴⁸

The **third principle** the CMPD relied upon in its reforms is transparency through communication. When crises occur, the department appears to be honest about its mistakes.⁴⁹ The CMPD was one of the first police departments in the country to adopt a community-involved disciplinary process for officers.⁵⁰ Accordingly, Charlotte has assembled a Community Relations Committee (CRC) that helps citizens file complaints and works to build trust.⁵¹ Every year, the CMPD issues a public report detailing the number of complaints filed and the circumstances surrounding any deadly use of force.

⁴⁴ Interview with Spencer Cochran, Lieutenant, Charlotte Police Dep't (Jan. 19, 2012) (echoing this view).

⁴⁵ *Id.*

⁴⁶ Interview with Todd Lontz, Lieutenant, Charlotte Police Dep't (Jan. 19, 2012).

⁴⁷ Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, *Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City*, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 805, 813-16 (1998) (observing the feedback loop inherent to rising crime rates in minority communities and the status-enhancing nature of certain crimes and arguing that where crime becomes the norm disorder can destroy social organization).

⁴⁸ See Dan M. Kahan, *Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing*, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1513, 1514-15, 1519 (2002).

⁴⁹ *Id.*

⁵⁰ CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG POLICE DEP'T, 2009 INTERNAL AFFAIRS REPORT 6, available at <http://charmeck.org/city/charlotte/CMPD/organization/PoliceChief/InternalAffairs/Documents/2009IAReport.pdf>.

⁵¹ *Id.* at 7-8.

The CMPD also uses community coordinators in its trust-building and collaborative work. Each response area has two community coordinators; of the two, at least one officer attends every neighborhood meeting.⁵² Because of the coordinators, every member of the community that attends a neighborhood meeting has the phone number and email address of an officer they can call directly to relay their concerns. The coordinators not only attend meetings, but they play a leadership role in many neighborhood groups. The officers work with community leaders to professionalize and streamline meetings, encourage more community members to attend, and delegate roles to citizens in helping to ensure the safety of their blocks.⁵³

The CMPD has continued to adapt its approaches to building relationships in the community. The department recently started assembling leadership counsels consisting of leaders from multiple neighborhoods within the same division, in order to improve coordination between neighborhoods. The CMPD also appointed an officer to focus on relations with Charlotte's Latino community given the unique challenges regarding trust, collaboration, and safety faced by the Hispanic community in Charlotte.⁵⁴

For example, several years ago, the CMPD undertook a problem-solving initiative that came to be known as the Hispanic Robbery Initiative. This initiative focused on the disproportionate victimization of low-income Hispanic residents in certain apartment complexes around Charlotte. Because some Hispanics had emigrated from countries where the police were known for their "brutality and corruption," their trust in the police was low.⁵⁵ Other Hispanics who were immigrants linked the police to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and possible deportation. Cultural differences and language barriers also contributed to a lack of understanding.⁵⁶ The Hispanic population tended to be very isolated in Charlotte and concentrated in several apartment complexes. Immigrants also tended to avoid using banks due to institutional mistrust; this fact was well publicized locally and contributed to Hispanic victimization.⁵⁷

The CMPD identified a major apartment complex with a high Hispanic population as a robbery hot spot.⁵⁸ After examining files for 12 documented robberies in the area, the police learned that most robberies took place at night, near a laundry complex, after a group had been drinking in the parking lot.⁵⁹ By the end of the intervention, the Park Apartments were no longer a robbery hot spot. Robberies were reduced by 72.7 percent in the complex over the course of a year, whereas robberies in the city rose by 13.1 percent (and rose by 29.7 percent for Hispanics).⁶⁰ Based on the success of the Park Apartment intervention, similar programs were initiated in five other hotspots across the city.

⁵² Interview with Anonymous Police Officer.

⁵³ *Id.*

⁵⁴ Interview with Danny Hernandez.

⁵⁵ *Id.*

⁵⁶ *Id.*

⁵⁷ *Id.*

⁵⁸ *Id.* at 2-3.

⁵⁹ *Id.* at 3.

⁶⁰ *Id.*

What Is Part I crime?

Part I crimes are “serious crimes” as defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Part I crimes include murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. The FBI collects information on Part I crime trends across cities, states, and the nation and reports these trends in its Uniform Crime Reports. As a result, many cities are concerned with their Part I crime statistics and tend to focus on these crimes in analysis—often to the detriment of other crimes, like drug trafficking, which may be similarly concerning to disadvantaged communities.

Lessons from Charlotte

Charlotte’s story provides a blueprint for wholesale reform. Although the complexity of Charlotte’s reforms may make them harder to replicate in combination, even when taken separately the CMPD’s efforts and goals are instructive. Its innovations over the last several years represent a stride forward for a major metropolitan department that was achieved with minimal friction. As a result, they have garnered positive reviews from citizens and have remained in place over time.

While Charlotte has rightly earned a reputation as a national model for collaborative policing techniques and has made serious headway in building trust with disadvantaged communities, the CMPD still faces numerous obstacles. Reported victimization, troublingly, increased from 1996 to 2003, moving from 7 percent to 8.8 percent.⁶¹ While around 8 percent of blacks reported being victimized, almost 14 percent of Latinos reported being victims of crime.⁶² In addition, as of 2003, most residents surveyed in minority communities *did not* believe that the police had reduced drug sales (only 44.2 percent thought sales had decreased).⁶³

The most notable barriers to CMPD’s strategies have been community ownership, the diversity of crime, and the timeline for the effect of collaboration on crime. One of the ongoing goals of the CMPD should be to increase community ownership. Although police have been able to bring community organizations into partnerships on some projects, most collaborative work originates from police-level observations and priorities. The current model of police ownership must evolve to include co-ownership from the community.

The CMPD must also expand its analysis of crime to include diverse types of crime. The CompStat system the department currently uses focuses on Part I crime, which leaves out several types of crime that may threaten a community’s sense of safety. Among others, drug crimes, vagrancy, and loitering have been excluded from analyses.

One of the hardest lessons from Charlotte is that building trust and collaboration may not

⁶¹ *Id.* at 33.

⁶² *Id.* at 34.

⁶³ *Id.* at 38.

have an immediate effect on crime rates. As of 2005, according to the FBI's measures, Charlotte was still a relatively dangerous city despite the work and successes of the CMPD.

Recommendations:

1. **Emphasize Trust And Collaboration Within The Police Department**
 - Adopt a mission statement and goals that focus on trust and collaboration
 - Train and reward officers based on these goals, fostering a culture of collaboration
 - Use methods to measure progress, including, for example, UCR Part I crime rates, citizen surveys measuring satisfaction, informal polls, and assessments of community response.

2. **“Sweat the Small Stuff” to Build Trust with the Community**
 - Work with community members and organizations to address even the smallest signs of disorder or complaints, from trashcans overflowing to nuisances like crumbling awnings
 - Ensure that community leaders are equipped to deal with disorder as well
 - Guarantee that each neighborhood has a leadership group that meets regularly and require at least one officer to attend every neighborhood meeting

3. **Increase Transparency and Communication**
 - Assign each response area two officers who serve as community coordinators
 - Direct coordinators attend every community meeting in their response area, get to know residents, and follow-up with victims of crime
 - Ask coordinators, along with the lieutenants who lead each response area, to compile newsletters on a monthly basis to keep community members informed
 - Ensure the Internal Affairs Division shares its assessment and other pertinent information with the community when police misconduct is suspected or force is used against civilians
 - Work with the Community Relations Committee to guide citizens through the complaint process

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The principals on our team include John Crombach, Gail Christopher, Darrel Stephens and James Forman, Jr.

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